FCM Conference Panel
Towards Equity and Efficiency in Policing
June 2, 2008
Speaking Notes for Chair Alok Mukherjee
I. Introduction
I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the important issue of cost of municipal policing from the perspective of those who are responsible for providing civilian governance, namely the police boards and commissions.
The spiralling cost of municipal policing is a matter of considerable concern for police boards and commissions as well as for police chiefs. For instance, it drew considerable attention at the annual joint meeting of the Canadian Association of Police Boards, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and the Canadian Police Association on March 28th.
To give just one example of the magnitude of the issue, fifty years ago in 1957, the budget for policing Metropolitan Toronto was $12,659,813. Today, it is slightly over $800M, and at the present rate of growth, in about 4 years, it will be touching $1B. In this same period, the population of Toronto has grown from 1,348,000 to 2.6 million, and the strength of the service has increased from 2,291 to over 7,750. In other words, the city’s population has doubled and the service has grown by some two and a half times. In the same period, Toronto’s police budget has increased over 63 times. Even if we accounted for factors such as inflation, changes in population, strength of the force and demand for service, impact of contract settlements, cost of replacing physical plant, equipment and materials, as well as the cost of acquiring new technology and tools, I do not believe we can explain this scale of change in the cost of municipal policing.
There is no question that a significant contributor to this situation is the fact that there is lack of clarity in which level of policing does what, that senior levels of government have either downloaded or abdicated their policing responsibilities, and that that whatever arrangements currently exist for the sharing of policing costs among the three levels of government are ad hoc and neither equitable nor efficient. As my friend, Michael Kempa of the University of Ottawa, said at a conference of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police in January this year, “Throughout Canada . . . there exist many ‘mixed messages’ for what exactly policing is and who ought to be contributing what to it.”
It is not surprising, therefore, that at every one of the annual meetings of our provincial and national associations, there are resolutions on some aspect of the issue of cost. We have to ask if the local tax base will continue to be able to sustain the current rate of growth and, alternatively, what the impact will be on our ability to afford all those other things that are so critical for the quality of the life of our communities. Sadly, the response to date from our senior levels of government has not been encouraging.
I would like to begin with a brief review of the cost pressures that we are experiencing in Toronto as a result of demands on policing caused by such jurisdictional issues as downloading of responsibilities by senior levels of government and inadequately resourced inter-jurisdictional policing.
II. Jurisdictional Demands and Pressures on Policing
There are several areas in which the Toronto Police Service, like many other police organizations across the country, is engaged in what I call inter-jurisdictional policing.
II.1 Intelligence/National Security
The first area is that of national security.
The population of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) exceeds 5.5 million people. Within the GTA, Toronto is the seat of provincial government as well as the place where the Toronto Stock Exchange, all the major banks, and countless financial firms and institutions are headquartered or represented. The head offices of numerous multinational corporations are situated here.
As terrorism has become a major issue threat since 9/11 generally and especially with Canada’s military engagements overseas, the safety of the city requires great vigilance. The Toronto Police Service must be involved in proactively monitoring, detecting, investigating and disrupting terrorist activities and related criminal acts. Even though national security is a federal responsibility and the Toronto Police Service acts in partnership with other services and agencies, being the policing agency closest to and best connected to the local community, it must assume a leadership role.
As such, the TPS Intelligence Services Unit has staff who conduct terrorism investigations and who manage and investigate any information that is considered a security threat. They work in conjunction with other agencies at the municipal, provincial and federal levels, exchanging and acting on information.
It may not be possible to quantify exactly the specific costs incurred by the Service for policing services in the area of Intelligence and National Security. But nor is there a clearly articulated formula, arrangement or protocol to review and deal with these costs. What the Service does receive is some indirect and in kind support from both the federal and provincial governments. This form of support is essentially ad hoc.
II.2 Emergency Planning
The second area is that of emergency planning.
Safety of the residents of Toronto through emergency planning is a municipal responsibility. For the Police Service, ensuring that it is able to adequately respond to, plan and prepare for, as well as mitigate and facilitate recovery from, any emergency or disaster that may impact Toronto, is part of the core business. A dedicated Emergency Management and Operations Unit exists within the Service’s Public Safety and Emergency Planning Unit for the purpose of coordinating all emergency planning for the Service.
Even though a potential threat and/or the cause of an incident may also be of provincial or federal interest, there is no federal or provincial government funding beyond what is already given in the form of grants.
II.3 Coast Guard Responsibilities:
The third area is that of coast guard responsibilities.
The Toronto Police Service is involved in significant coast guard responsibilities. The Toronto Harbour Police, established in 1912, carried out traditional coast guard duties in the Toronto area. When the Service integrated the Toronto Harbour Police into its operations in 1982, all previous Toronto Harbour Police responsibilities were assumed by the Marine Unit.
Our Marine Unit has jurisdiction over some 1200 square kilometres of open water, 47 kilometres of shoreline and an international border with New York State. Its responsibilities include responding to calls for service and providing law enforcement on the water, the Toronto Islands, including the Toronto City Centre Airport, and medical transport of sick or injured persons from the Islands to the mainland and a patrol, search and rescue capability on Lake Ontario from the shoreline to the international border.
The TPS Marine Unit’s coast guard duties include supervision of boat launches, inspections of boats for legislated safety equipment, public education on boating safety; and search and rescue operations in co-ordination with Canadian Forces Base Trenton.
Thus, the nature of the mandate requires the Marine Unit to enter into partnerships with security agencies in Canada as well as the United States. It is also responsible for enforcing the federal Shipping and Marine Acts. With the Toronto Port Authority looking at an increase in cargo shipping in the Harbour by an additional 200,000 freight containers and the Porter Air Service planning an expansion in its traffic at the Toronto City Centre Island Airport in order to bring an additional 200,000 travellers, the inter-jurisdictional responsibilities of the Marine Unit are bound to increase significantly.
In 2004, a new code was accepted that required the Marine Unit to increase its resources, both in terms of the types and quantity of vessels maintained as well as the number of staff. The federal government committed to fund 75% of the changes required.
However, just as that was a one-time funding, the Marine Unit receives other ad hoc federal funding for items like search and rescue.
Admittedly, the provision of coast guard related services is so intertwined with the day to day policing operations of the Marine Unit that it may not be possible to quantify the actual cost of activities that either fall under a different jurisdiction or cross jurisdictions. But the fact is that there is no systematic provision or mechanism for a review of the impact of either downloading by federal agencies or participation in joint activities, and, therefore, of the proportion of costs that should be borne by the federal government.
II.4 Consulate Protection
The fourth area where the work of the Toronto Police Service crosses jurisdictions, is consulate protection.
While embassies usually exist in Ottawa, major urban centres, such as Toronto, house consulates. And some, such as the United States consulate, attract considerable attention from the public.
In 1963, Canada committed, as a signatory to the Vienna Convention, to “take all appropriate steps to protect the consular premises against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the consular post or impairment of its dignity (Article 31.2).” While the RCMP has the primary responsibility of ensuring the security of internationally protected persons from threats of murder, assault, kidnapping and hostage-taking, the federal and provincial Solicitors Generals have agreed, through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) established in 1986, that this primary responsibility can be specifically given to local authorities.
In 1993, the Toronto Police Service entered into an MOU with the RCMP and the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) to ensure an orderly and cooperative atmosphere under which federal, provincial and municipal services respond to a possible threat to the security of Canada and/or an internationally protected person. By virtue of these agreements with the provincial and federal levels of government the responsibility for providing policing services to and protecting consulates within Toronto has become a municipal responsibility. The Service receives no funding from the federal government in carrying out this responsibility, though the RCMP participates in providing protection to these consulates and other locations through the use of confidential protective services, which includes a mobile patrol and response component.
The Police Service has found itself unable to quantify, for the purposes of cost recovery, what portion of its day to day policing work is in fact related to the “protection” of consulates. From the point of view of the Police Services Board, and the City, the fact is that, in the absence of a proper and meaningful mechanism, the impact of such joint undertakings on municipal policing and the ability of the local municipal police to serve the direct needs of the local taxpayer is not assessed or compensated for.
II.5 Organized Crime
Investigation of organized crime is my fifth area.
Organized crime investigations are very complex and frequently may span provincial and federal interests, even though the primary responsibility rests with the local police service. But because such investigations are commonly intertwined with policing activities that are part of the Police Service’s mandate, it is suggested that the specific costs of such investigations cannot be ascertained.
However, since the Toronto Police Service currently enjoys a co-operative relationship with the various levels of government relative to organized crime investigations, there is considerable sharing of resources. While this is to be applauded, there are two issues here. First, it is the nature of relationships that they depend on personalities and can change as players change. And, second, because one police service enjoys such relationship does not mean that all services do, resulting in the possibility of differential treatment. This is a case in point to argue that Inter-governmental relations must be formalized as a matter of public policy.
II.6 Court Security
The last area I want to touch upon is court security, which is exclusively a provincial-municipal concern.
According to section 137 of the Ontario Police Services Act, police services boards are responsible for ensuring “the security of judges and of persons taking part in or attending proceedings.” I understand that Ontario is the only province in Canada where the cost of court security is paid entirely out of property tax, even though it is the province that opens and operates the court facilities.
In Toronto, this creates a disproportionate burden on the property tax payer compared to other municipalities because court facilities here are used by many people who are not Toronto residents. This is not to deny that the current system has a disproportionate impact on other, smaller municipalities as well. As seats of the provincial court, they must take full responsibility for court security even though the courts themselves serve a broader population.
There is only one answer to the issue of equity arising out of this downloading by the province of Ontario: the province must take back the funding of all those functions that are not directly and expressly the responsibility of the local police service.
In Toronto, the cost of providing court security since the province downloaded the responsibility to municipalities in 1990 has grown steadily. Since 1990, the cost for providing security in court facilities and costs related to prisoner transportation to and from the court facilities has grown from under $16M to an estimated $47M in 2008.
The Toronto Police Services Board has, over the years, repeatedly asked that the impact of court security costs on the Toronto Police Service be examined with a view to the province uploading these costs from municipalities. In addition, the Ontario Association of Police Services Boards has called upon the government of Ontario to reassume full responsibility for the cost of providing court security. Until this is done, OAPSB has asked that the provincial government reimburse court security costs to police services under a full cost recovery contract for all court security costs.
III. Efforts to Deal with Cost Pressures
Like members of police services boards across the province, many municipal councils in Ontario are becoming increasingly concerned about the rising costs of their emergency services.
One result of this shared concern was the establishment of the Emergency Services Steering Committee (ESSC), which includes CAOs and/or heads of Human Resources from a number of municipalities represented by MARCO (Mayors and Regional Chairs of Ontario) and LUMCO (Large Urban Mayors Caucus of Ontario), and senior staff representatives and members of the OAPSB. The overall goal is to take a better coordinated, strategic approach to issues which significantly increase emergency service program costs, in order to ensure that these programs are delivered efficiently and effectively.
However, the primary focus of this coordinated approach is on labour costs, which take up approximately 90% of the budgets of emergency services. The committee’s mandate is to look at such key areas as developing a database for labour relations information, identifying bargaining trends, reviewing pertinent legislative and regulatory changes, and developing a communications strategy regarding emergency services labour cost issues.
IV. Conclusion(s)
It is clear from this quick review of trends in the cost of municipal policing in one city, Toronto, that outright downloading of policing responsibilities, cross-jurisdictional policing and the need to provide policing services to fill a gap or an unmet need have been major drivers.
We have to take a very serious view of the impact of these trends on the property taxpayer. And we have to take a serious view of the differential impact on municipalities on the basis of their local tax base.
The situation calls for formalized arrangements between the two levels of government, municipalities and police services boards. Such arrangements, with clear protocols, need to replace the current practice of providing supports on an ad hoc basis depending on relationships. Unfortunately, funding arrangements based on relationships politicize support and do not foster equitable sharing of costs and resources.
An important and very relevant example is the manner in which the federal government implemented its commitment to fund 2500 police officers across Canada. While this was a recognition that the federal government does have a role to play in municipal policing, the manner in which the government fulfilled its commitment was neither equitable nor efficient. If the purpose was to put more police feet on the streets of our communities, surely, there was a need to get input from local municipalities, police services boards and police services. There was a need as well to ensure that the dollars went to local communities, and that they were sustainable dollars. Instead, what was unilaterally provided was ad hoc, partial funding. The net effect on those who do get a few of those dollars will be that an additional cost pressure will have been created for them.
We must be seriously concerned that if the situation is not dealt with soon, equitable, effective and efficient municipal policing will become unaffordable. As well, the trend may have a broader impact on the quality of life in our communities in terms of our municipalities’ ability to address other important areas of programs and services.
To the extent that the actions of federal and provincial governments are responsible for creating this situation, mechanisms must be found to engage them in finding solutions. I believe that FCM needs to forge a partnership with the Canadian Association of Police Boards, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and the Canadian Police Association in seeking to engage our governments in this undertaking.
I should add, finally, that the emerging additional policing needs lend further urgency to the need to resolve the respective regulatory and resource responsibilities of the three orders of government. I am referring, for example, to the area of cyber crime. As a recent study by the CAPB shows, this is an area that is growing exponentially, crosses all sorts of jurisdictions, is not well understood, and is woefully inadequately resourced. Cyber crime touches, or can touch, each and every Canadian. The interest of public safety demands that all levels of government, police services boards, police chiefs and police associations make this a common cause.
It is time to put an end to “mixed messages.” I believe that FCM’s equity and efficiency allocation model provides a good basis for discussion.
Thank you.
Thursday, December 31, 2009
Let’s Tackle the Mismatches!
CAPB Annual Conference 2009
Sydney, Nova Scotia
Plenary Session: Crisis in Policing
August 14, 2009
Speaking notes for
Alok Mukherjee
Chair, Toronto Police Services Board
Let’s Tackle the Mismatches!
I. INTRODUCTION
That there is a crisis looming over municipal policing in Canada due to expanding demands, escalating costs, and an inefficient funding system, to name a few factors, has been widely accepted for some time among police oversight agencies and police leaders. With its report, “Towards Equity and Efficiency in Policing,” released last year, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities has joined the conversation. Largely absent from the table is the country’s federal and provincial political leadership.
Our efforts to bring the country’s leadership to the discussion have been based largely on the argument that while both levels of government have downloaded many policing responsibilities on to municipal policing, they have not picked up their fair share of the cost for these responsibilities. To the extent that municipal policing is affected by decisions of all levels of government, a seamless approach crossing jurisdictional boundaries with respect to financing of local policing would, of course, be immensely beneficial.
In my view, the discussion of who pays for what in local policing must be contextualized in a larger framework of what municipal policing today is all about. Therefore, I propose to discuss the issue of crisis in policing in terms of what I would call “the mismatches". I will name three:
1. Mismatch between what police are supposed to do and
what police actually do;
2. Mismatch between a community’s and the state’s needs and demands, and allocation of resources; and,
3. Mismatch between the legislative supports police organizations want and the supports they get.
II. THE “MISMATCHES”
Let me speak briefly about each of these mismatches.
1. Mismatch between what police are supposed to do and
what police actually do
Local policing has moved way beyond its origin in the protection of private property. As anyone who has done a few full shifts with frontline police officers can testify, police officers who are assigned to primary response, community response, neighbourhood safety and other such units perform a wide variety of tasks. In one tour of duty, they may respond to a landlord-tenant dispute, a domestic assault, a public complaint about noise, a neighbourhood’s concern about the presence of prostitutes and drug dealers, a person suffering from mental illness, a fracas among groups of young people, a fight, a traffic infraction; or they may patrol neighbourhoods making contact with residents, establishing a visible presence; or they may show their presence at community events, even helping out; or, as in Toronto, they may be ensuring public safety at massive public festivals and events attended by tens of thousands.
Sometimes, as in Toronto, safety in schools becomes a public issue and everyone looks to the police to respond. And the police do with dedicated resources.
These are among the things that the bulk of our frontline uniform officers routinely do, and is by no means an exhaustive list.
Every so often, there is a homicide or a traffic fatality or some other act of violence. Once in a while, there is a dramatic development that captures media or public attention. A missing child, the violent death of a young person, a major drug bust – and so on.
On top of these, there are demands and pressures on our police services imposed by federal and provincial governments either through straight downloading, or by an abdication of their policing responsibilities or because the local police organization is best placed to deal with them. These include, for example, areas such as international/national security, emergency planning, coast guarding, consulate protection, organized crime investigation and court security.
There are demands, as well, due to new forms of crime that have the potential to touch every person. I am referring to financial crimes and cyber crimes.
But what is it that the law describes as core policing services? Let me quote the relevant section from Ontario’s Police Service Act by way of example. I assume that this description is not very dissimilar from descriptions of core policing services in other provinces’ police service acts.
Police services in municipalities
4. (1) Every municipality to which this subsection applies shall provide adequate and effective police services in accordance with its needs. 1997, c. 8, s. 3.
Core police services
(2) Adequate and effective police services must include, at a minimum, all of the following police services:
1. Crime prevention.
2. Law enforcement.
3. Assistance to victims of crime.
4. Public order maintenance.
5. Emergency response. 1997, c. 8, s. 3.
As a description of “core police services,” this list does not capture a considerable part of what police officers and police services actually do on a daily basis, except through an extremely broad reading of the words. The law reflects a conventional view of policing in terms of crime, law and order, when, in reality, municipal police services today have become a critical partner in preserving and enhancing a community’s overall quality of life.
This gap between what local policing actually does and what it is supposed to do is the first “mismatch.” We simply do not have a framework for local policing that represents our contemporary reality.
2. Mismatch between a community’s and the state’s needs and demands, and allocation of resources
The second mismatch, which flows from the first, is between a community’s and the state’s needs and demands and allocation of resources in terms of staffing, training and finances.
I would put it to you that while some police officers, especially the members of our tactical and specialized units, may deal with violent crimes on a regular basis, the majority of our uniform members are routinely engaged in activities that, not so long ago, police officers used to sneeringly refer to as “social work.”
Many of these activities are imposed by the state. The municipality wants the police service to enforce a plethora of by-laws. The province gives the police service an important role in enforcing mental health acts, intervening in landlord tenant disputes, and so on. The federal government, as I have noted earlier, looks to local policing in numerous areas that fall under its jurisdiction.
It is arguable whether each and every one of these roles must involve uniform police officers trained in use of force. But in our model of policing, allocation of human resources is based on the assumption that every single task must be performed by a uniform police officer armed with full police powers and equipped with all use of force options.
In some areas, specifically court security and parking enforcement, we have made effective use of special constables with limited police powers as well as civilians. In responding to people experiencing mental health crises, police services in cities like Toronto have entered into partnerships with local hospitals whereby a police officer teams up with a mental health nurse to respond to calls for service.
I would put it to you that there is room for considerable discussion as to whether all of the policing services must be provided by uniform police officers. Perhaps it is time for us to look at staffing strategies being used in places like London, England, or to broaden our own use of a combination of uniform and non-uniform members.
Another way that this mismatch in allocation of resources shows up is in terms of training. Because of the persistence of the conventional model of policing, basic training and re-training required by provincial adequacy regulations as well as local policies and procedures emphasize training related to dealing with criminal situations over everything else that members of police services do. Police officers re-certify every year in use of force. This is obviously critical. But what about dealing effectively with mental health, homelessness, sexual assaults, victimization of the vulnerable, white collar crime, etc.? What about all the social causes of public disorder that police services must deal with? Can we say with confidence that the training regimen of our services provides members with the necessary level of knowledge, skills and abilities in all of the areas in which we provide services? In other words, is allocation of training resources commensurate with need? Are we making the most effective and efficient use of the money we invest in training and development? Are we getting the best value for money?
Finally, then, let us turn to the money itself – the tax dollars that are allocated year after year to support police budgets. It is now accepted in police governance circles that police budgets are fast approaching a level that they will have a serious impact on a municipality’s ability to pay for all those other programs that are as important as policing for fostering healthy communities.
Police budgets are tied to the ability of a police service to deliver on priorities established periodically in the context of the core services that are legally required to be provided. I have suggested that those core services are not consistent with and do not capture fully what police services actually do today. Yet, in building annual budgets there continues to be an over-emphasis on a crime fighting model of policing at the expense of a full and adequate analysis of the work that police services actually do. This budget is, as a consequence, affected by the notion that all work must be done by uniform officers, on one hand, and training should be primarily based on a crime fighting model delivered primarily by uniform police officers.
I believe there is significant room for reflection with respect to this mismatch.
3. Mismatch between the legislative supports police organizations want and the supports they get
I now come to my third and final mismatch, that is, between the legislative supports police organizations want and the supports they get.
Let me give a couple of examples to illustrate the point I wish to make.
In Ontario, as in some other jurisdictions, the Police Services Act does not permit an extension of the probationary period for a probationary police constable. Neither does it permit the suspension without pay for a police officer accused of an egregious offence. Both are outdated and inefficient human resources practices. In the first instance, we run the risk of losing our investment in someone who, with some additional training, could be a perfectly satisfactory member of the service. In the other instance, we may carry on our payroll, sometimes for years, an officer whose conduct is an affront to community standards and expectations.
For years, police boards and police chiefs have asked the province to make the necessary changes in the legislation to align it with contemporary standards. This is not a case of downloading or uploading but of giving us the tools to run our affairs along modern human resource management principles. So far, we have been unsuccessful, and the local community pays the price.
My second example comes from the federal jurisdiction. In recent years, police boards and chiefs have asked for support in dealing with the gun crime that challenges communities like Toronto. Our request has included a variety of legislative and administrative measures to staunch the illegal importation of guns, ban on use of handguns for other than law enforcement purposes and strengthening of the gun registry. There have been pleas as well for enhanced investment in crime prevention. Even Canada’s Chief Medical Officer has called for such investment.
On the face of it, these may appear to have little to do with the escalating cost of policing. In fact, they are very much related. In the absence of strengthened legislative and administrative support, the onus on local policing to deal with these challenges is increased significantly. It is the local services that must find the resources for encouraging prevention. And if, instead of maintaining and strengthening the gun registry, it is abolished or rendered meaningless, police services will find it that much more difficult to deal with crimes involving firearms.
These are just a few examples of the way in which refusal or failure of governments to give the police the legislative and administrative tools they need contributes to the crisis we face in our ability to deliver the policing that our communities need and want. There is a mismatch caused by political considerations that are out of sync with the realities of policing.
III. CONCLUSION
To conclude, then, my point is that the crisis caused by the escalating cost of policing is only partly the result of downloading of responsibilities by federal and provincial levels of government. I believe that the pressure on resources is caused by a multiplicity of factors, primary among which is a continuing and growing mismatch on several levels. It is incumbent upon police governance bodies, police leaders and municipal governments to develop a full understanding of these mismatches as well as a comprehensive strategy to tackle them.
Thank you.
Sydney, Nova Scotia
Plenary Session: Crisis in Policing
August 14, 2009
Speaking notes for
Alok Mukherjee
Chair, Toronto Police Services Board
Let’s Tackle the Mismatches!
I. INTRODUCTION
That there is a crisis looming over municipal policing in Canada due to expanding demands, escalating costs, and an inefficient funding system, to name a few factors, has been widely accepted for some time among police oversight agencies and police leaders. With its report, “Towards Equity and Efficiency in Policing,” released last year, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities has joined the conversation. Largely absent from the table is the country’s federal and provincial political leadership.
Our efforts to bring the country’s leadership to the discussion have been based largely on the argument that while both levels of government have downloaded many policing responsibilities on to municipal policing, they have not picked up their fair share of the cost for these responsibilities. To the extent that municipal policing is affected by decisions of all levels of government, a seamless approach crossing jurisdictional boundaries with respect to financing of local policing would, of course, be immensely beneficial.
In my view, the discussion of who pays for what in local policing must be contextualized in a larger framework of what municipal policing today is all about. Therefore, I propose to discuss the issue of crisis in policing in terms of what I would call “the mismatches". I will name three:
1. Mismatch between what police are supposed to do and
what police actually do;
2. Mismatch between a community’s and the state’s needs and demands, and allocation of resources; and,
3. Mismatch between the legislative supports police organizations want and the supports they get.
II. THE “MISMATCHES”
Let me speak briefly about each of these mismatches.
1. Mismatch between what police are supposed to do and
what police actually do
Local policing has moved way beyond its origin in the protection of private property. As anyone who has done a few full shifts with frontline police officers can testify, police officers who are assigned to primary response, community response, neighbourhood safety and other such units perform a wide variety of tasks. In one tour of duty, they may respond to a landlord-tenant dispute, a domestic assault, a public complaint about noise, a neighbourhood’s concern about the presence of prostitutes and drug dealers, a person suffering from mental illness, a fracas among groups of young people, a fight, a traffic infraction; or they may patrol neighbourhoods making contact with residents, establishing a visible presence; or they may show their presence at community events, even helping out; or, as in Toronto, they may be ensuring public safety at massive public festivals and events attended by tens of thousands.
Sometimes, as in Toronto, safety in schools becomes a public issue and everyone looks to the police to respond. And the police do with dedicated resources.
These are among the things that the bulk of our frontline uniform officers routinely do, and is by no means an exhaustive list.
Every so often, there is a homicide or a traffic fatality or some other act of violence. Once in a while, there is a dramatic development that captures media or public attention. A missing child, the violent death of a young person, a major drug bust – and so on.
On top of these, there are demands and pressures on our police services imposed by federal and provincial governments either through straight downloading, or by an abdication of their policing responsibilities or because the local police organization is best placed to deal with them. These include, for example, areas such as international/national security, emergency planning, coast guarding, consulate protection, organized crime investigation and court security.
There are demands, as well, due to new forms of crime that have the potential to touch every person. I am referring to financial crimes and cyber crimes.
But what is it that the law describes as core policing services? Let me quote the relevant section from Ontario’s Police Service Act by way of example. I assume that this description is not very dissimilar from descriptions of core policing services in other provinces’ police service acts.
Police services in municipalities
4. (1) Every municipality to which this subsection applies shall provide adequate and effective police services in accordance with its needs. 1997, c. 8, s. 3.
Core police services
(2) Adequate and effective police services must include, at a minimum, all of the following police services:
1. Crime prevention.
2. Law enforcement.
3. Assistance to victims of crime.
4. Public order maintenance.
5. Emergency response. 1997, c. 8, s. 3.
As a description of “core police services,” this list does not capture a considerable part of what police officers and police services actually do on a daily basis, except through an extremely broad reading of the words. The law reflects a conventional view of policing in terms of crime, law and order, when, in reality, municipal police services today have become a critical partner in preserving and enhancing a community’s overall quality of life.
This gap between what local policing actually does and what it is supposed to do is the first “mismatch.” We simply do not have a framework for local policing that represents our contemporary reality.
2. Mismatch between a community’s and the state’s needs and demands, and allocation of resources
The second mismatch, which flows from the first, is between a community’s and the state’s needs and demands and allocation of resources in terms of staffing, training and finances.
I would put it to you that while some police officers, especially the members of our tactical and specialized units, may deal with violent crimes on a regular basis, the majority of our uniform members are routinely engaged in activities that, not so long ago, police officers used to sneeringly refer to as “social work.”
Many of these activities are imposed by the state. The municipality wants the police service to enforce a plethora of by-laws. The province gives the police service an important role in enforcing mental health acts, intervening in landlord tenant disputes, and so on. The federal government, as I have noted earlier, looks to local policing in numerous areas that fall under its jurisdiction.
It is arguable whether each and every one of these roles must involve uniform police officers trained in use of force. But in our model of policing, allocation of human resources is based on the assumption that every single task must be performed by a uniform police officer armed with full police powers and equipped with all use of force options.
In some areas, specifically court security and parking enforcement, we have made effective use of special constables with limited police powers as well as civilians. In responding to people experiencing mental health crises, police services in cities like Toronto have entered into partnerships with local hospitals whereby a police officer teams up with a mental health nurse to respond to calls for service.
I would put it to you that there is room for considerable discussion as to whether all of the policing services must be provided by uniform police officers. Perhaps it is time for us to look at staffing strategies being used in places like London, England, or to broaden our own use of a combination of uniform and non-uniform members.
Another way that this mismatch in allocation of resources shows up is in terms of training. Because of the persistence of the conventional model of policing, basic training and re-training required by provincial adequacy regulations as well as local policies and procedures emphasize training related to dealing with criminal situations over everything else that members of police services do. Police officers re-certify every year in use of force. This is obviously critical. But what about dealing effectively with mental health, homelessness, sexual assaults, victimization of the vulnerable, white collar crime, etc.? What about all the social causes of public disorder that police services must deal with? Can we say with confidence that the training regimen of our services provides members with the necessary level of knowledge, skills and abilities in all of the areas in which we provide services? In other words, is allocation of training resources commensurate with need? Are we making the most effective and efficient use of the money we invest in training and development? Are we getting the best value for money?
Finally, then, let us turn to the money itself – the tax dollars that are allocated year after year to support police budgets. It is now accepted in police governance circles that police budgets are fast approaching a level that they will have a serious impact on a municipality’s ability to pay for all those other programs that are as important as policing for fostering healthy communities.
Police budgets are tied to the ability of a police service to deliver on priorities established periodically in the context of the core services that are legally required to be provided. I have suggested that those core services are not consistent with and do not capture fully what police services actually do today. Yet, in building annual budgets there continues to be an over-emphasis on a crime fighting model of policing at the expense of a full and adequate analysis of the work that police services actually do. This budget is, as a consequence, affected by the notion that all work must be done by uniform officers, on one hand, and training should be primarily based on a crime fighting model delivered primarily by uniform police officers.
I believe there is significant room for reflection with respect to this mismatch.
3. Mismatch between the legislative supports police organizations want and the supports they get
I now come to my third and final mismatch, that is, between the legislative supports police organizations want and the supports they get.
Let me give a couple of examples to illustrate the point I wish to make.
In Ontario, as in some other jurisdictions, the Police Services Act does not permit an extension of the probationary period for a probationary police constable. Neither does it permit the suspension without pay for a police officer accused of an egregious offence. Both are outdated and inefficient human resources practices. In the first instance, we run the risk of losing our investment in someone who, with some additional training, could be a perfectly satisfactory member of the service. In the other instance, we may carry on our payroll, sometimes for years, an officer whose conduct is an affront to community standards and expectations.
For years, police boards and police chiefs have asked the province to make the necessary changes in the legislation to align it with contemporary standards. This is not a case of downloading or uploading but of giving us the tools to run our affairs along modern human resource management principles. So far, we have been unsuccessful, and the local community pays the price.
My second example comes from the federal jurisdiction. In recent years, police boards and chiefs have asked for support in dealing with the gun crime that challenges communities like Toronto. Our request has included a variety of legislative and administrative measures to staunch the illegal importation of guns, ban on use of handguns for other than law enforcement purposes and strengthening of the gun registry. There have been pleas as well for enhanced investment in crime prevention. Even Canada’s Chief Medical Officer has called for such investment.
On the face of it, these may appear to have little to do with the escalating cost of policing. In fact, they are very much related. In the absence of strengthened legislative and administrative support, the onus on local policing to deal with these challenges is increased significantly. It is the local services that must find the resources for encouraging prevention. And if, instead of maintaining and strengthening the gun registry, it is abolished or rendered meaningless, police services will find it that much more difficult to deal with crimes involving firearms.
These are just a few examples of the way in which refusal or failure of governments to give the police the legislative and administrative tools they need contributes to the crisis we face in our ability to deliver the policing that our communities need and want. There is a mismatch caused by political considerations that are out of sync with the realities of policing.
III. CONCLUSION
To conclude, then, my point is that the crisis caused by the escalating cost of policing is only partly the result of downloading of responsibilities by federal and provincial levels of government. I believe that the pressure on resources is caused by a multiplicity of factors, primary among which is a continuing and growing mismatch on several levels. It is incumbent upon police governance bodies, police leaders and municipal governments to develop a full understanding of these mismatches as well as a comprehensive strategy to tackle them.
Thank you.
The Cost of Policing in Toronto and the Annual Budget Dance
Alok Mukherjee
Chair, Toronto Police Services Board
Sure as winter comes every year, we are, once again, witnessing the annual questioning of the police budget. Reporters, editorial writers, certain individuals known for their scepticism on matters related to policing and concerned City Councillors are, once again, expressing worry about the growth of the police budget. However, except saying that they would like to see an actual decrease in the budget, they have offered very few, if any, options for cutting the budget.
The few suggestions that have been made will either produce insignificant reductions or yield temporary savings that will have to be made up in the future, with a worse impact in the long run.
There is no question that sustainability of cost of policing is fast emerging as a critical issue for police governance bodies and municipalities.
In Toronto, over the past five years, the Police Services Board and the police service led by Chief Bill Blair have been working very hard to grapple with this issue. The following breakdown throws some interesting light.
Net Budget Increases, Including Salary Settlements – 2005-2009
Year ...Net $ Increase (in millions) .....% increase
2005 ...$38.6 ......................................5.70
2006 ...$36.3 ......................................5.07
2007 ...$33.8 ......................................4.49
2008 ...$35.8 ......................................4.55
2009 ...$32.8 ......................................3.99
As the figures show, despite the fact that during these years the Toronto Police Services Board negotiated two collective agreements with the Toronto Police Association, the annual net increases have generally maintained a downward trend. As well, in those five years, the police have returned to the City unspent funds to the tune of $20 million. And we have done so while absorbing City-requested reductions totalling $22 million in the operating budget.
We have followed a downward trendline in our budgeting at a time when the City responded to the crime situation in Toronto by increasing the strength of the police service by an additional 450 officers. This included 200 officers whom Chief Blair took out of plainclothes and put in uniform and the hiring of 250 new officers. These new officers were partly paid for by the province out of its 1000 Officer program. This significant increase in staffing, while adding to the payroll, did not increase overtime costs due to stringent controls.
Controls have, in fact, been implemented not only on this portion of the salary account but also on the entire non-salary account. These controls are part of a comprehensive strategy being followed by the Board and the Command under Chief Blair in how the business of policing is conducted in Toronto. It includes, for example, promoting a culture of managing for value, obtaining maximum efficiencies in our use of resources like fuel and electricity, reducing waste, doing more with less and getting the most out of the funds we receive from sources like the province.
At the same time, the Board and the Service are working closely with the police association to make our system of shift scheduling more efficient and effective. After over a quarter of a century of living with the same system, this work, when completed, will provide better alignment between deployment and calls for service for the community and better work-off work balance for our officers.
In terms of our biggest cost – salary and benefits – the Board has engaged in hard negotiations with the police association in 2005 and 2008. In 2008, the arbitrator’s award that followed a prolonged and tough negotiation included only a pay increase that was consistent with the industry standard and small improvements in medical benefits. Given the excessive demands and inflexible position of the association – demands that would have cost many more millions of dollars – the arbitrator’s award was actually a very responsible one from the taxpayer’s perspective.
I believe that the approach we have taken will have a lasting impact. We are, however, saddled with patterns of increases and contract settlements from prior years.
For example, in 2002, the police association was given “retention pay” as part of contract settlement. Meant to address an immediate need to prevent officers from leaving the Toronto Police Service, the Board of the day, with City Council’s support, agreed to a permanent provision to pay a 3%, 6% and 9% increase in salary to officers after 7, 15 and 23 years of service. While it may have made sense as a solution for a problem being faced at the time, it makes no sense whatever as a permanent giveaway.
Anyone who has sat at a bargaining table knows that a concession once given is not easily taken away. Cumulatively, retention pay has added millions to the payroll, even though the problem of retention is long gone.
Another significant pressure was caused by the decision of the provincial government in 1999 to download the cost of court security on to the municipalities. The province opens court houses; the local taxpayer pays. Thus, the cost of court security in Toronto has risen from $15 million in 1990 to $48 million in 2009.
The McGuinty government has acknowledged this pressure on municipalities and has agreed to gradually take over the cost of court security once again.
Cost of court security is an example of how decisions and directions by other levels of government have added to the cost of municipal policing. Unlike Ontario, the Federal government has refused to discuss its responsibility for the cost of policing in areas that fall squarely within its jurisdiction. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities, in a report two years ago, calculated that between 7 to 15% of the cost of municipal policing is directly attributable to the Federal jurisdiction. For Toronto, that would amount to at least $60 million a year.
It is worth remembering that a 1% increase in property tax equals approximately $15 million. In other words, Torontonians are subsidising the Federal government’s policing interests by well over 4% of their property taxes.
Thus, between paying for court security and providing policing services that come under the Federal jurisdiction Toronto’s property taxpayer spends over $100 million in policing that it ought not to have to.
When discussing the cost of policing, it is important, I believe, that we not lose sight of all these factors. They include historical decisions made at the bargaining table as well as the significant extent to which Toronto pays for costs that properly belong to other levels of government. It is within this context that the Toronto Police Services Board and the Toronto Police Service have, in the last five years, made every effort to hold the line on the cost of policing in this City.
For those of us involved with the governance of policing, the cost of policing is not an issue that we worry about once a year. It is an ongoing issue. The Canadian Association of Police Boards and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities have recognized that this is a structural, systemic and political issue and needs to be dealt with as such. The scope of policing has expanded significantly, and municipal police services are taking on responsibilities in areas that are not strictly local. It is imperative that all stakeholders – police boards, police chiefs, municipalities, provincial and federal governments – come together to look for long term solutions to the challenge of making the cost of policing sustainable and affordable.
This is what we in police boards are striving towards. For us, the police budget is not an annual dance.
I have personally spoken on this subject numerous times. The two articles that follow describe the dimensions of the challenge and offer some solutions that, in my view, we should pursue.
Chair, Toronto Police Services Board
Sure as winter comes every year, we are, once again, witnessing the annual questioning of the police budget. Reporters, editorial writers, certain individuals known for their scepticism on matters related to policing and concerned City Councillors are, once again, expressing worry about the growth of the police budget. However, except saying that they would like to see an actual decrease in the budget, they have offered very few, if any, options for cutting the budget.
The few suggestions that have been made will either produce insignificant reductions or yield temporary savings that will have to be made up in the future, with a worse impact in the long run.
There is no question that sustainability of cost of policing is fast emerging as a critical issue for police governance bodies and municipalities.
In Toronto, over the past five years, the Police Services Board and the police service led by Chief Bill Blair have been working very hard to grapple with this issue. The following breakdown throws some interesting light.
Net Budget Increases, Including Salary Settlements – 2005-2009
Year ...Net $ Increase (in millions) .....% increase
2005 ...$38.6 ......................................5.70
2006 ...$36.3 ......................................5.07
2007 ...$33.8 ......................................4.49
2008 ...$35.8 ......................................4.55
2009 ...$32.8 ......................................3.99
As the figures show, despite the fact that during these years the Toronto Police Services Board negotiated two collective agreements with the Toronto Police Association, the annual net increases have generally maintained a downward trend. As well, in those five years, the police have returned to the City unspent funds to the tune of $20 million. And we have done so while absorbing City-requested reductions totalling $22 million in the operating budget.
We have followed a downward trendline in our budgeting at a time when the City responded to the crime situation in Toronto by increasing the strength of the police service by an additional 450 officers. This included 200 officers whom Chief Blair took out of plainclothes and put in uniform and the hiring of 250 new officers. These new officers were partly paid for by the province out of its 1000 Officer program. This significant increase in staffing, while adding to the payroll, did not increase overtime costs due to stringent controls.
Controls have, in fact, been implemented not only on this portion of the salary account but also on the entire non-salary account. These controls are part of a comprehensive strategy being followed by the Board and the Command under Chief Blair in how the business of policing is conducted in Toronto. It includes, for example, promoting a culture of managing for value, obtaining maximum efficiencies in our use of resources like fuel and electricity, reducing waste, doing more with less and getting the most out of the funds we receive from sources like the province.
At the same time, the Board and the Service are working closely with the police association to make our system of shift scheduling more efficient and effective. After over a quarter of a century of living with the same system, this work, when completed, will provide better alignment between deployment and calls for service for the community and better work-off work balance for our officers.
In terms of our biggest cost – salary and benefits – the Board has engaged in hard negotiations with the police association in 2005 and 2008. In 2008, the arbitrator’s award that followed a prolonged and tough negotiation included only a pay increase that was consistent with the industry standard and small improvements in medical benefits. Given the excessive demands and inflexible position of the association – demands that would have cost many more millions of dollars – the arbitrator’s award was actually a very responsible one from the taxpayer’s perspective.
I believe that the approach we have taken will have a lasting impact. We are, however, saddled with patterns of increases and contract settlements from prior years.
For example, in 2002, the police association was given “retention pay” as part of contract settlement. Meant to address an immediate need to prevent officers from leaving the Toronto Police Service, the Board of the day, with City Council’s support, agreed to a permanent provision to pay a 3%, 6% and 9% increase in salary to officers after 7, 15 and 23 years of service. While it may have made sense as a solution for a problem being faced at the time, it makes no sense whatever as a permanent giveaway.
Anyone who has sat at a bargaining table knows that a concession once given is not easily taken away. Cumulatively, retention pay has added millions to the payroll, even though the problem of retention is long gone.
Another significant pressure was caused by the decision of the provincial government in 1999 to download the cost of court security on to the municipalities. The province opens court houses; the local taxpayer pays. Thus, the cost of court security in Toronto has risen from $15 million in 1990 to $48 million in 2009.
The McGuinty government has acknowledged this pressure on municipalities and has agreed to gradually take over the cost of court security once again.
Cost of court security is an example of how decisions and directions by other levels of government have added to the cost of municipal policing. Unlike Ontario, the Federal government has refused to discuss its responsibility for the cost of policing in areas that fall squarely within its jurisdiction. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities, in a report two years ago, calculated that between 7 to 15% of the cost of municipal policing is directly attributable to the Federal jurisdiction. For Toronto, that would amount to at least $60 million a year.
It is worth remembering that a 1% increase in property tax equals approximately $15 million. In other words, Torontonians are subsidising the Federal government’s policing interests by well over 4% of their property taxes.
Thus, between paying for court security and providing policing services that come under the Federal jurisdiction Toronto’s property taxpayer spends over $100 million in policing that it ought not to have to.
When discussing the cost of policing, it is important, I believe, that we not lose sight of all these factors. They include historical decisions made at the bargaining table as well as the significant extent to which Toronto pays for costs that properly belong to other levels of government. It is within this context that the Toronto Police Services Board and the Toronto Police Service have, in the last five years, made every effort to hold the line on the cost of policing in this City.
For those of us involved with the governance of policing, the cost of policing is not an issue that we worry about once a year. It is an ongoing issue. The Canadian Association of Police Boards and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities have recognized that this is a structural, systemic and political issue and needs to be dealt with as such. The scope of policing has expanded significantly, and municipal police services are taking on responsibilities in areas that are not strictly local. It is imperative that all stakeholders – police boards, police chiefs, municipalities, provincial and federal governments – come together to look for long term solutions to the challenge of making the cost of policing sustainable and affordable.
This is what we in police boards are striving towards. For us, the police budget is not an annual dance.
I have personally spoken on this subject numerous times. The two articles that follow describe the dimensions of the challenge and offer some solutions that, in my view, we should pursue.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Happy Holidays
As we near the end of 2009, I would like to take this opportunity to reflect on the important work completed in the past year and to look forward to the year ahead.
For the Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 was an extremely busy, productive and challenging year, as we built upon our previous work in a number of critical areas, such as dealing with human rights issues, developing environmental initiatives, working collaboratively to end gun violence in our communities and finding strategies to more efficiently manage the cost of policing.
In addition, this year the Board’s 2009-2011 Business Plan was implemented, setting the tone for the Service’s priorities and vision in the years ahead. Among the key themes of the Business Plan, the Service will continue to focus on helping women who are victims of sexual assault and domestic violence and to target activities involving violence, guns and gangs in our neighbourhoods. In addition, providing equitable and professional services to its members and the public will be a Service priority as recognize and value the diversity of the people of Toronto.
2009 was also a year of change in leadership as the Board bid farewell to Deputy Chief Jane Dick and welcomed Deputy Chief Peter Sloly as the newest member of the Command team. The Board honoured Deputy Chief Dick for her impressive 35 years of service, commending her for her strong leadership, her approachability, her high ethical standards, her sense of fairness, her deep commitment to the highest quality of public service and her dedication to the community.
In selecting Deputy Chief Sloly, the Board cited his personal commitment to justice, safety, community-based policing and bias-free service delivery will help the Board and the Service to meet the needs and expectations of all Torontonians.
In addition, the Toronto Police Association saw a change of leadership this year, with Michael McCormack elected as the new President of the TPA. On behalf of the Board, I look forward to a productive, respectful relationship with Mr. McCormack as we work together on issues of great importance to both of us.
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to each and every member of our Service who, through their hard work, diligence and dedication, remind us daily why our organization is regarded as a policing leader in excellence and innovation.
On behalf of the Toronto Police Services Board, I want to wish you and your families all the best for the holiday season.
Best wishes for a happy, healthy and safe New Year.
Alok Mukherjee
Chair
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)